Getting what you want: power increases the accessibility of active goals

Power facilitates goal-directed behavior. Two studies, using different types of goals, examined the cognitive mechanisms that underlie this tendency. Participants, primed with power or powerlessness, performed lexical decision tasks that assessed the relative facilitation of goal-relevant constructs during goal striving and after goal attainment. Results showed that during goal striving powerful participants manifested an increased facilitation of goal-relevant constructs compared to other constructs, and this facilitation decreased immediately after goal completion. In contrast, their powerless counterparts showed less facilitation of goal constructs during goal striving and maintained goal accessibility after completion. These results are consistent with the effects of power on goal-directed behavior found in past research

How quickly can you detect it? Power facilitates attentional orienting

This study investigated how power impacts the ability to orient attention across space. Participants were assigned to a high power or control role and then performed a computerised spatial cueing task in which they were required to direct their attention to a target that had been preceded by either a valid or invalid location cue. Compared to participants in the control condition, power-holders were better able to override the misinformation provided by invalid cues. This advantage occurred only at 500 ms stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA), whereas at 1000 ms SOA, when there was more time to prepare a response, no differences were found. These findings are taken to support the growing idea that social power affects cognitive flexibility

Value stability and change during self-chosen life transitions: Self-selection versus socialization effects

Copyright @ 2013 APA. This article may not exactly replicate the final version published in the APA journal. It is not the copy of record.Three longitudinal studies examine a fundamental question regarding adjustment of personal values to self-chosen life transitions: Do values fit the new life setting already at its onset, implying value-based self-selection? Or do values change to better fit the appropriate and desirable values in the setting, implying value socialization? As people are likely to choose a life transition partly based on their values, their values may fit the new life situation already at its onset, leaving little need for value socialization. However, we propose that this may vary as a function of the extent of change the life transition entails, with greater change requiring more value socialization. To enable generalization, we used 3 longitudinal studies spanning 3 different life transitions and different extents of life changes: vocational training (of new police recruits), education (psychology vs. business students), and migration (from Poland to Britain). Although each life transition involved different key values and different populations, across all 3 studies we found value fit to the life situation already early in the transition. Value socialization became more evident the more aspects of life changed as part of the transition, that is, in the migration transition. The discussion focuses on the implications of these findings for research on values and personality change, as well as limitations and future directions for research

State authenticity

State authenticity is the sense that one is currently in alignment with one’s true or real self. We discuss state authenticity as seen by independent raters, describe its phenomenology, outline its triggers, consider its well-being and behavioral implications, and sketch out a cross-disciplinary research agenda

Identifying differences in the experience of (in)authenticity: a latent class analysis approach

Generally, psychologists consider state authenticity– that is, the subjective sense of being one’s true self – to be a unitary and unidimensional construct, such that (a) the phenomenological experience of authenticity is thought to be similar no matter its trigger, and (b) inauthenticity is thought to be simply the opposing pole (on the same underlying construct) of authenticity. Using latent class analysis, we put this conceptualization to a test. In order to avoid over-reliance on a Western conceptualization of authenticity, we used a cross-cultural sample (N = 543), comprising participants from Western, South-Asian, East-Asian, and South-East Asian cultures. Participants provided either a narrative in which the described when they felt most like being themselves or one in which they described when they felt least like being themselves. The analysis identified six distinct classes of experiences: two authenticity classes ('everyday' and 'extraordinary'), three inauthenticity classes ('self-conscious,' 'deflated,' and 'extraordinary'), and a class representing convergence between authenticity and inauthenticity. The classes were phenomenologically distinct, especially with respect to negative affect, private and public self-consciousness, and self-esteem. Furthermore, relatively more interdependent cultures were less likely to report experiences of extraordinary (in)authenticity than relatively more independent cultures. Understanding the many facets of (in)authenticity may enable researchers to connect different findings and explain why the attainment of authenticity can be difficult

Trait and state authenticity across cultures

We examined the role of culture in both trait and state authenticity, asking whether the search for and experience of the 'true self' is a uniquely Western phenomenon or is relevant cross-culturally. We tested participants from the US, China, India, and Singapore. US participants reported higher average levels of trait authenticity than those from Eastern cultures (i.e., China, India, Singapore), but this effect was partially explained by cultural differences in self-construal and thinking style. Importantly, the experience of state authenticity, and especially state inauthenticity, was more similar than different across cultures. In all, people from different cultures do experience authenticity, even if they do not endorse the (Western) value of “independence.” The findings contribute to a more nuanced understanding of state authenticity

Sketching the contours of state authenticity

We outline a program of research in which we examined state authenticity, the sense of being one’s true self. In particular, we describe its phenomenology (what it feels like to be experience authenticity), its correlates(e.g.,emotions,needs),itsnomologicalnetwork(e.g.,real-idealselfoverlap,publicandprivate self-consciousness), its cultural parameters (Easter and Western culture), its precursors or determinants (congruency, positivity, and hedonism), and its psychological health implications. We conclude by arguing that state authenticity deserves its own conceptual status, distinct from trait authenticity, and by setting an agenda for future research

How does “being real” feel? The experience of state authenticity

Objective: We propose that the experience of state authenticity—the subjective sense of being one's true self—ought to be considered separately from trait authenticity as well as from prescriptions regarding what should make people feel authentic. Methods: In Study 1 (N  = 104), online participants rated the frequency of and motivation for experiences of authenticity and inauthenticity. Studies 2 (N = 268) and 3 (N  = 93) asked (local or online, respectively) participants to describe their experiences of authenticity or inauthenticity. Participants in Studies 1 and 2 also completed measures of trait authenticity, and participants in Study 3 rated their experience with respect to several phenomenological dimensions. Results: Study 1 demonstrated that people are motivated to experience state authenticity and avoid inauthenticity and that such experiences are common, regardless of one's degree of trait authenticity. Coding of Study 2's narratives identified the emotions accompanying and needs fulfilled in each state. Trait authenticity generally did not qualify the nature of (in)authentic experiences. Study 3 corroborated the results of Study 2 and further revealed positive mood and nostalgia as consequences of reflecting on experiences of authenticity. Conclusions: We discuss implications of these findings for conceptualizations of authenticity and the self

Power increases situated creativity

The present paper examined whether power was linked with situated creativity. We proposed that powerful (vs powerless) people engage in creative thought when creativity contributes to contextual goals but avoid creative thought when creativity impedes contextual goals. Extending the Situated Focus Theory of Power (Guinote, 2007a; 2010) to creativity, we suggested that powerful people are better able to achieve situational goals because they can flexibly focus on cues that indicate what is required for success in a given context. Across three experiments, we found that powerful (vs powerless) people engaged in more creative thinking when creativity facilitated contextual goals. This was not the case when creativity hindered contextual goals. Further, neither affect (Experiment 2) nor effort (Experiments 1 and 3) contributed to these effects. However, local processing undermined creativity for powerful people, indicating that processing style may contribute to the link between power and situated creativity. These findings suggest that powerful people flexibly vary creativity in line with the situation

I feel good, therefore I am real: testing the causal influence of mood on state authenticity

Although the literature has focused on individual differences in authenticity, recent findings suggest that authenticity is sensitive to context; that is, it is also a state. We extended this perspective by examining whether incidental affect influences authenticity. In three experiments, participants felt more authentic when in a relatively positive than negative mood. The causal role of affect in authenticity was consistent across a diverse set of mood inductions, including explicit (Experiments 1 and 3) and implicit (Experiment 2) methods. The link between incidental affect and state authenticity was not moderated by ability to down-regulate negative affect (Experiments 1 and 3) nor was it explained by negative mood increasing private self-consciousness or decreasing access to the self system (Experiment 3). The results indicate that mood is used as information to assess one’s sense of authenticity